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BUSINESS AND THE COMMON GOOD
IN THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION
Robert G Kennedy*

It is not the mission of the Church to work out practical methods by which the just state is
brought into being. The function of the Church is to form public men who will. Men of
Christian conscience and moral purpose, who believe that human beings have a right to live
on the plane of morality, dignity, and security intended by God.
Henry Morton Robinson
The Cardinal(1950)

From the perspective of the Catholic social tradition there are a number of questions
posed by the existence and activities of publicly-held corporations in the modern world.
Not least among these questions are concerns about the responsibilities of managers, and
particularly executives, who make the choices that govern the strategic and operational
activities of these companies. What are the general duties of corporate managers and
executives? What fundamental moral responsibilities do persons in these roles have? Are
these responsibilities consistent with the duties prescribed by secular law?
Someone interested in exploring such questions in the Catholic tradition might
reasonably expect to turn for answers to the numerous documents on social matters
produced by popes and bishops over the last century, but in this he will be disappointed.!
Church authorities have had little to say about these issues but this should not be taken to
mean that the Catholic social tradition has no resources with which to resolve them. To
assemble the resources necessary to address our questions we need to explore briefly the
often- misunderstood nature of this tradition.
I.

THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION

The Catholic social tradition (CST) is an element of a broader moral tradition. 2 As such,
it should be understood not as a static body of doctrine, passively received by one
generation after another, but rather as a dynamic body of knowledge-not unlike the
physical sciences-that is augmented and developed in linear fashion over time. To put it
another way, CST is not a codified body of principles and rules for arranging social
interactions, but is rather an evolving response to a concern about the context in which
Dr. Kennedy is a professor in the Department of Management and Founding Director of the John Ryan
Institute for Catholic Social Thought at the University of St. Thomas.
The standard American collection of papal and episcopal documents is DAVID J. O'BRIEN & THOMAS
A. SHANNON, EDS., CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE (1992).
2 A good introduction to basic concepts in the Catholic social tradition, especially for readers with a
background in law, is Angela C. Carmella, "A Catholic View of Law and Justice," in MICHAEL W
MCCONNELL, ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR, AND ANGELA C. CARMELLA, EDS., CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (2001) at 255-276.
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human persons grow, develop and live their lives, a natural result of the Catholic
understanding of the human being as an embodied spirit and a social creature. 3
Contrary to a common view, this tradition did not originate with the modern papal
encyclicals that have contributed to it. In its various manifestations it is as old as the
Church itself, being well represerted in the writings of the Patristic period (the first
centuries), the Middle Ages, and the Early Modern period.
CST has generally had two modes, or functions, though one or the other has often
been especially emphasized in different times and places. One mode is a critique of
aspects of social life insofar as they influence the well-being of human persons (and
perhaps insofar as they can be influenced). The second mode is a set of proposals
concerning the shape and substance of a society that would fully respect human dignity.
More crudely put, in one mode CST identifies what is wrong with a society, while in the
other it attempts to describe what a truly good society should be.
Furthermore, there are three dimensions, or areas of attention, that are integral to
CST. One dimension is political, where the tradition considers forms of government,
jurisprudence, and the proper uses of power. A second dimension is economic, where the
tradition considers questions of human needs and scarce resources. The third dimension
is cultural, where the tradition pays attention to the richness of social arrangements,
artistic expressions, and other manifestations of human intelligence and creativity that
shape and give an identity to members of a community. Once again, different dimensions
have been emphasized at different times. The political dimension, for example, was of
greater concern in medieval Europe than the economic dimension, while today the
opposite is true. These dimensions, too, can be explored at different levels. For example,
papal contributions on economic topics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries tended to focus on local and national economic matters, such as the tension
between labor and ownership, while later contributions gave more attention to economic
relationships between nations.
It must also be emphasized that this tradition is not by any means the exclusive
province of the hierarchy of the Church. The Church's self-understanding that it is the
particular responsibility of the laity to bring the Gospel to the secular world 4 -to the
home, to the school, to the workplace, to the political arena-and so CST especially
profits from the contributions of lay thinkers and practitioners. The popes and bishops
ordinarily conceive their role to be to articulate principles and encourage sound

3 See Pope John Paul 11,Sollicitudoreisocialis(1991) 1.
4 This theme is a constant in Church documents of the past 40 years. See, for example, the Second Vatican
Council (1962-65): Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen gentium), paragraph 36; Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et spes), paragraph 43; and Decree on the
Apostolate of the Laity (Apostolicam actuositatem), paragraph 2 and passim. This theme also receives
considerable emphasis in the 1988 post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation The Vocation and Mission of the
Lay Faithful(Christifideleslaici).
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applications. It is not their role in the normal course of events to prescribe solutions to
concrete problems; this is the task of the laity. 5
It may be fairly said that all of Catholic moral theology is an unfinished project.
While fundamental principles may be preserved, the understanding of the implications of
principles may always be deepened and new challenges call for new applications. This is
particularly true for CST, and for two reasons. First, human societies are unstable.
Political structures change, cultures mutate, and new forms of economic organization are
devised. All of this calls for continual reflection and adaptation. Second, despite two
millennia of development, the tradition has not systematically examined every aspect of
human social life. For example, there has been a bias in the tradition against a careful
reflection on the importance of creating wealth (and not merely distributing it), and so
there has been little contemporary reflection on the topic. 6 A similar limitation exists
concerning the function, structure and management of business organizations. 7 The
tradition has devoted considerable attention to families and to civil societies, but has not
caught up with the modem proliferation of intermediate associations, or with the peculiar
problems they present.
As a result, when we pose a question about the moral responsibilities of managers
and executives, we cannot simply pull a book from the shelf or consult an official Church
document for the answer. To be sure, the tradition has articulated and defended principles
and concepts that can be brought to bear on these questions, but the work of doing so has
not yet been done for us. We will turn to that task now.

6

In recent years, and in some countries more than others, bishops and their staffs have been relatively
aggressive in commending specific pieces of legislation or in supporting certain public policies. While
bishops as individual citizens are surely free to express their views on public matters, the practice of
official advocacy has occasioned considerable discussion within the Catholic community, and some
concern that this constitutes an intrusion on the part of the bishops, or their staffs, into a properly lay
arena. Indeed, I have spoken with Catholic legislators who have expressed their frustration with
episcopal representatives who have presented a particular political preference as a matter of Catholic
doctrine, thereby compromising Catholic legislators who, as a matter of prudential judgment, support
alternate policies.
This may be changing, but the suspicion of wealth is deeply embedded in Catholicism. Furthermore, the
very age and diversity of the tradition makes it difficult to grasp it as a comprehensive whole. Sixteenthcentury Spanish theologians, for example, produced some very sophisticated analyses of the problems of
wealth and commerce that have been largely forgotten for centuries and still remain virtually inaccessible
to English-speaking audiences.
We may even go so far as to say that CST has hardly moved beyond the critical mode in its treatment of
wealth creation and business. The combination of apprehension about the temptations of wealth and a
deeply-rooted sympathy for labor has moved most thinkers in this field, including many bishops, to do
little more than scold businesspeople for their attitudes and practices. This, too, is changing but the
constructive mode of CST in this area is still seriously underdeveloped. For examples, however, of papal
efforts to recognize the vocation, virtues, and contributions of businesspeople, see GARY ATKINSON,
ROBERT G. KENNEDY, and MICHAEL NAUGHTON, EDS., THE DIGNITY OF WORK: POPE
JOHN PAUL II SPEAKS TO MANAGERS AND WORKERS (1994).
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KEY CONCEPTS FROM THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION

The foundation of CST is the reality of God's merciful love. This is the recognition that
God has loved us when we are undeserving of that love, and that this love is the model of
the love that we ought to have for one another. 8 Everything we possess-our property,
our talents, our skills, our resources-is a gift from this loving God, to be used not only
for our own well-being but also for his purposes, which include achieving and protecting
the well-being of others.
This claim is ultimately grounded not in scholarly analysis or lived experience
(though both may support it) but rather in the conviction that it has been revealed in time
by God himself to human persons. That is to say, God has himself told us the truth about
the human condition and the faithful Christian response is to accept that truth and to
embrace it as the foundation of a reasonable and well-ordered life. Thus a Christian
approach to life and society will have a logic of its own, a set of principles that define
what is truly reasonable and sensible (which is to say, genuinely prudent) in practical
affairs.
There are, of course, many alternate views of what is reasonable and prudent but
Christians must consider in evaluating these views whether they are wmpatible with
what God has revealed and in particular with the model of God's merciful love. If God
has indeed revealed the truth in Christ, then Christianity is not simply one proposal
among many for maximizing the efficiency of human systems and interactions. It has a
distinctive starting point and a distinctive end (i.e., a conception of genuine human
fulfillment) and it must measure proposals about human structures and systems with these
in mind. 9
Moving beyond the foundation of God's merciful love, there are two further
conceptual pieces to which we must attend. They concern human nature, and property
and wealth.
A.

THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN PERSON

In his 1991 encyclical Centesimus annus, Pope John Paul II claimed that socialist
societies (and for that matter, totalitarian societies of all sorts) had collapsed because they
were grounded in a false conception of the human person. 10 No society rooted in
falsehood or confusion can long survive; certainly none can be just. Now the Catholic
Church has repeatedly insisted that it does not have specific recommendations to make
about legal structures, forms of government, economic arrangements, or cultural

8 See John 3.16 and 1 John 4.7-21.
9 CST can readily adopt and endorse many of the practical insights of contemporary economic thinking, for
example, but it may well not accept the fundamental assumptions about human nature that underlie this
thinking. It is at this level of principle and not the level of application that the differences must be
confronted and sorted out.
10 Centesimus annus 24, 29.
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frameworks."' These must be determined by the members of a society for themselves.
Nevertheless, while it may not claim practical expertise in such matters, the Church does
claim to be an "expert in humanity." 12 By this it means that it has a set of principles to
offer to the human community according to which practical arrangements of all sorts may
be evaluated for their potential to benefit or harm human persons.
1.

The human person is an imago Dei.

The first of these principles is that each and every member of the human species is a
person possessed of an irreducible dignity, or value. This dignity derives from the fact
that each individual is an imago Dei, an image of God, with a supernatural destiny. '" This
reality makes each and every person valuable, regardless of age, physical condition,
social status, or other qualifications.
2.

14

The human person possesses reason and free will.

Second, human persons instantiate divine attributes most properly in their possession of
the God-like capacities to reason and to choose freely. Every individual is challenged in
her life to develop these twin capacities to the fullest extent possible, both in the
speculative realm and the practical arena. 15 The degree to which human associations and
systems are open to this individual development will be one criterion according to which
they will be evaluated.
3.

The human person is social by nature.

Third, human persons are radically social by nature. This is to say that, like the Trinity,
human persons are essentially members of societies, not merely individuals who form
societies as matters of expediency.

I

Centesimus annus 43. See also Gaudium et spes 42.

12

Sollicitudo rei socialis 7. See also Pope Paul VI, Populorum progressio (1967) 13.

13 The Catholic theological tradition understands by this not merely that each individual is somehow a

reflection of the divinity, since all of creation reflects the Creator in some way. It understands more than
this; namely that the human person is the one creature on earth that God willed to create for its own sake
(see Gaudium et spes 24) and that the human person alone among these creatures shares in the divine
attributes of mind and immortality.
14 This does not mean that each person must be equally honored or respected in a given community. Some
people will always be rightly honored for their holiness, or for their extraordinary contributions to human
welfare, or for their virtue, or for the offices they assume, or for a variety of other reasons (some better
than others). Nor does it mean that no discrimination can be made between the innocent and the guilty.
Still, it does mean that regardless of his or her wickedness or lack of distinction, each person is due a
minimum of respect and protection that can never be legitimately set aside. Hence the Catholic
convictions about abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, war, and so on.
15 Catholic moral theology has long found it convenient to adopt informally Aristotle's theory of
intellectual and moral virtues as a useful but not complete means to describe the challenge and goal of
human development.
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In this regard, the Catholic tradition is set against more recent philosophical
traditions that assume that, in a so-called state of nature, human persons would live their
lives and find their fulfillment in solitude rather than society. On this view, communities
are formed as matters of unfortunate necessity, in order to avoid undesirable outcomes,
rather than as means to achieve desirable outcomes that would otherwise be impossible. 16
Even those who would not posit quite so dark a view of the need for human communities
are still likely to see societies as collections of individuals peacefully and privately
pursuing their own satisfactions rather than as true human communities.
On the Catholic view, a true human community in the fullest sense is one in which
every aspect of human flourishing is potentially a matter of public concern and in which
persons actively collaborate in bringing one another to fulfillment. It is just such a
community that we yearn to form and to which we seek to belong, and it is only in such a
community that individuals can truly be fulfilled. 7
There is a sharp and real contrast here between Catholic thought and some of the
philosophical convictions that animated America's founding fathers. They were strongly
influenced by the work of philosophers like John Locke and firmly disposed by their
experience (both as British subjects and as Protestants) to cherish and protect individual
rights. In principle, CST has no quarrel with this, as the protection of individual rights
can also be the protection of human dignity. However, as has become so evident in the
twentieth century, an excessive emphasis on individual liberty can shelter actions and
systems that harm the dignity of vulnerable members of the community. At the very least,
an emphasis on individualism tends to distort communities into dis-integrated collections
where higher value is attached to non- interference than collaboration. 18
CST encourages a corrective rooted in an understanding of the person as social,
though this corrective can also be carried too far. On this view, human institutions of all
sorts are minimally satisfactory to the extent that they do not positively damage, or
encourage harm to, human dignity. But these institutions can also aspire to be excellent,
which would require them positively to promote human dignity and human flourishing.

16 Thomas Hobbes is a classic representative of this view, as is John Locke in a more gentle way. A
contemporary proponent of this view is John Rawls, although he may not subscribe to Hobbes's gloomy
vision of the need for the first human communities.
17 See below, section XXX. The Catholic understanding of the importance of community should not be
simply equated with the various "communitarian" schools of thought
economics. While there may be a number of points of agreement,
between Catholic thinking and these philosophies on all aspects of
underlies these schools of thought.
18 The Catholic vision of a well-ordered society is neither libertarian nor

in contemporary philosophy and
there is certainly not consensus
the vision of human nature that
communist. It respects and values

initiative and personal responsibility, on the one hand, and encourages collaboration and solidarity on the
other. It recognizes the importance of sound government for the preservation of the common good, but it
also emphasizes subsidiarity, which limits the action of higher levels of government when lower levels or
individuals themselves can act competently.
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4.

The distinctive requirements of justice.

The Catholic conviction about the social nature of human persons also leads to a subtle
change in our understanding of the requirements of justice. In a contractarian conception
of society, the individual has obligations in justice only when he has voluntarily accepted
such obligations (as in a contract) or when they are imposed by a legitimate authority
(such as taxes). On the Catholic view, however, one has obligations to others not only as
matters of promise-keeping or obedience to law, but also because of the inherent dignity
of these others, coupled with our dependence on God's merciful love. In other words,
when it is in our power to address the unmet needs of others, we have a duty, injustice, to
do so even where we are not bound by law or promises. Justice requires that we give to
others what they deserve to have, and they deserve to have what they need in order to
pursue their own perfection. 19
B.

PROPERTY AND WEALTH

Some of the earliest examinations of social questions written by Christians concerned
property and wealth. 20 The tradition has a great deal to say about the subject, but four
points will be important to the present discussion.
1.

The right of ownership is a natural right.

One constant in the modern papal discussions of social issues has been an insistence on
the importance of the right to private ownership of property. 21 The popes regard this as a
natural right, which means that it is not a right granted by government or voluntary
agreement, but rather one which is rooted in human nature. 22 To put it another way, to
deny individuals the right to private ownership of property is to attack their very dignity
23
as human persons.

19 Perhaps it goes without saying that the practical working out of the requirements of justice in a particular

20

community is a task of great difficulty and controversy. This conception of justice does not require the
redistribution of wealth so that all are equal, though it would encourage a sharing of excesses with those
who fall below a minimum of resources required for a decent human life. Nor does it demand ignorance
of the incentives that motivate ordinary persons in a fallen world, or of the weaknesses that cause some
people to fail to provide the necessities of life for themselves. It is incompatible, though, with a
conviction that the private ownership of property may be absolute.
Consider, for example, Clement of Alexandria, Quid dives salvetur? (Can the Rich Man Be Saved?),

21

written about A.D. 200 in Alexandria.
See, for example, Pope Leo XIII, Rerum novarum (1891); Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimoanno (1931) 44-

22

49; Pope John XXIII, Mater et magistra (1961) 104-121; Pope John Paul II, Centesimus annus, 30-32.
A good contemporary discussion of the issue of private property in a Catholic context is Daniel R Finn,

"Catholic Social Thought on Property: An Urgent Need for Extension and Renewal," in ROBERT G
KENNEDY, et al, EDS., RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE: THE LEGACY OF MONSIGNOR JOHN A.
RYAN (2001) at 95-116.
23 This is not to say that any individual person has a natural right to own this or that piece of property. It is
merely to say that the right to own property belongs in the same category as the right to life or the right to
an education and cannot be denied to an innocent person.
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As embodied sirits, human beings require the use and consumption of material
resources in order to live their lives. While the Christian tradition has sometimes
celebrated the voluntary renunciation of private ownership for the sake of a more intense
pursuit of spiritual goods, it has always been recognized that such a renunciation is
suitable only for a limited number of people. CST has generally acknowledged that
human welfare is better served in the aggregate when property rights are protected.24
People will take better care of what they own and they are motivated to work harder if
25
they know that ownership can be the result of their labors.
2.

The right of ownership is qualified, not absolute.

Nevertheless, it is also a staple of the Catholic moral tradition that the right to own
property is qualified, not absolute. 26 God gave the earth and all of its resources to the
human community for the benefit of all. Private ownership may be a natural right, but the
right is exercised legitimately when resources are intentionally distributed in such a way
as to provide for the minimal needs of every person. No one may rightly possess what he
does not need and cannot consume when the basic needs of others are unmet, especially
when these needs are unmet through no fault of those who are deprived.27 The model of
God's merciful love requires those who own property to use it or to dispose of it, not only
for their own benefit, but also for the benefit of others.
3.

Wealth is a good, but it may tempt persons to evil.

Wealth, understood as an abundance of property, has always posed a problem for CST.
For much of the Christian era, wealth was more or less static and based on the ownership
of land. There was no real question of creating new wealth but a preoccupation with the
just distribution of existing wealth. The changes brought about in the modem era,
beginning with the discovery and exploitation of the New World in the sixteenth century
and continuing with the explosive creation of new wealth in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, have posed still new challenges to CST.
Certainly, as a component of God's creation, wealth is good in itself. It is good for
persons and communities to be prosperous. In the Old Testament, while wealthy persons
may often have acquired their wealth through wickedness, prosperity itself was
24 A classic statement is St Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, llallae, q. 66, aa 1-2.
25 See the discussions of the importance of private property to the laborer that run throughout Rerum
novarum.
26 See, for example, Aquinas, Summa theologiae, liallae, q. 66, a 7, where he argues that when someone in
great need takes articles from another person who possesses great abundance he does not commit a sin of
theft. His argument is that the great need of the first person gives him a claim on the excess property of
the other as if it were his own. Similar statements can be found throughout the tradition.
27 The tradition, mindful of St Paul's admonition to the Thessalonians that "anyone who would not work
should not eat" (2 Thess 3.10), has always insisted on personal responsibility. In the first instance, it is
the responsibility of all those who are able to do so actually to provide for the material needs of
themselves and their families. Those who cannot do so justly deserve a share of the wealth of the
community, but those who simply choose not to work have no such claim.
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considered a blessing and part of God's promise for his people. Nevertheless, Christians
have always regarded wealth as a mixed blessing since it can distract individuals (and
institutions) from their supernatural destinies (and authentic missions).
Furthermore, while issues concerning the distribution of scarce resources have not
yet been resolved, it is also true that little energy has been devoted to the questions posed
by the reality of abundance (rather than scarcity) and by important new forms of property
(e.g., information and technical knowledge). Not least among these challenges is the
question of how to regard business organizations as objects of ownership.
4.

Property must be valued in the light of human welfare, and not for itself.

In general, the value of property in CST and the legitimization of private ownership is
always referred to human welfare. Ownership is a right because it enables the person to
fulfill himself and more effectively pursue his vocation, whatever that might be. The right
to possess property is strong, but it does not trump human welfare, and so must be
subordinated in any community to the common good. What is of real, final value in the
world is persons; all other objects derive their value instrumentally, which is to say from
their capacity to fulfill and perfect human persons. 28 This relationship would be turned
upside down-and history is full of examples of just this-if the genuine well-being of
persons was not merely risked but sacrificed for the sake of preserving property. 2'As a
related theme, Pope John Paul II has often emphasized that "Work is for man, not man
30
for work.",

II.

31
COMMON GOODS AND THE COMMON GOOD

When one first realizes that human persons are naturally social beings, and that their
genuine fulfillment inevitably involves a community of some sort, one begins to
understand the critical importance of common goods. Attempts to understand and resolve
issues of justice in a community must sooner or later deal with the question of what it
means for goods to be common. Unfortunately, the term "common good" is quite
28

In the end, only persons and the effects of their good choices endure (see Gaudium et spes 39). As a

consequence, possessions of whatever sort can never reasonably be valued more highly than the persons
they ought to serve.
29 One might imagine that someone could reasonably risk, or even sacrifice, his life to preserve a

30

possession, but only if the possession has the capacity to contribute substantively to the fulfillment of
others. It would be extremely irrational deliberately to destroy or substantively damage persons in order
to protect a possession that, while valued in the marketplace, had little capacity to contribute to genuine
human fulfillment.
See, for example, Laborem exercens (1981) 6, 12.

31 This section of the paper, and the next, attempts to lay out in rather summary form the basic elements of

a theory of common goods and specialized associations that is compatible with CST. While dependent in
many ways on the Catholic moral tradition, especially in its Thomistic roots, it is also indebted to the
work of Germain Grisez and John Finnis. However, the form in which it appears here is more or less
original with the author, who accepts responsibility for all of its weaknesses and oversights. It should not
be misunderstood as a summary of CST or of the work of Grisez and Finnis.
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equivocal and this equivocation (and the frequent failure to identify explicitly the
meaning intended in a particular context) is the cause of a great deal of intellectual
mischief.
A.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF A COMMON GOOD.

It is a mistake to speak of the common good, as if there were one good (or collection of
goods) that composed the common good. Goods, or a good, may be said to be common in
a number of ways. Most generally, however, we may say that a common good by
definition is one that is, or may be, shared (owned, used, enjoyed or pursued) by a
number of persons.
Some goods we may call naturalcommon goods because they simply cannot be
owned, used, or enjoyed just by one person at a time. Examples of natural common goods
would include the view of a starry sky, the tradition and culture of a community, or
knowledge of the natural law. Most goods, though, are contingent common goods, which
means that they may at some time be common, but only because of a set of contingent
factors that creates a context in which they are owned, used, or enjoyed by a number of
persons. Examples of these goods would be wide-ranging, but could include land, works
of art, many kinds of knowledge, medicines, money, and so on.
Goods are sometimes said to be common because their nature is such that they may
be shared among an indefinite number of persons without diminishment. This
inexhaustible shareability, however, is a property of some kinds of goods that may be
either natural or contingent common goods, but it is not part of the definition of a
common good. For example, knowledge of how to make absolutely superb chocolate chip
cookies does not diminish (i.e., become less accurate or complete) if it is shared widely,
but it might lose a great deal of its potential for generating wealth if it were held in
common and the creator of the recipe were not able to sell the cookies exclusively. The
entire system of patent protection is intended to ensure that even if certain kinds of
knowledge are held in common (and the secrets of patented products and processes are
publicly accessible), the wealth derived from the application of that knowledge may be
possessed privately. So, these goods that may be shared without diminishment are not
therefore necessarily common goods. It might be better to speak of them simply as
unlimited or infinite goods, susceptible of distribution to an indefinite number of persons
without diminishment.
By contrast, a limited orfinite good is one that cannot be distributed to a number of
persons (for their possession, use, or enjoyment) without diminishment. For example, a
community of some kind may hold, say, a supply of medicine in common. That is, the
supply of medicine is not owned by an individual or a limited group of people within the
community, but instead is the property of the community as a whole. (Of course, we
could also be talking about land, or money, or food, or housing space, or any other
distributable resource.) Commonality has to do principally with ownership, not with the
character of a common good itself.
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B.

COMMON GOODS ARE INSTRUMENTAL OR FINAL.

Anything that serves as the object of intentional human action is a good, or at least an
apparent good. Furthermore, the good sought in any human action is either a final good
or an instrumental good. A final good is one which, once achieved or possessed, brings
an end to the action or series of actions directed toward it. An instrumental good is one
which serves as a tool for the attainment of yet another good. The action or series of
actions directed toward this instrumental good continues on toward some further good. 32
Another way of putting this is to say that final goods are desired by human agents
(whether rightly or wrongly) in and of themselves, and not because they are useful aids in
accomplishing or possessing some further good. Instrumental goods, on the other hand,
are really only desired because their achievement or possession furthers a larger plan to
achieve some other good. Speculative knowledge that is not immediately useful but
satisfies curiosity is one kind of final good, as are most forms of play and aesthetic
experience. Money, power, and academic degrees (as distinct from the knowledge gained
by studying for the degree) are all instrumental goods.
Many goods have a sort of mixed character. They may be the culmination of a
determinate set of actions, and so have the character of a final good, but they may also be
valued for their itility in bringing about another good. For example, a man may carry
through a plan to acquire a new power tool, not because he has a specific goal in mind for
which the tool might be useful, but because he believes that the tool will be an excellent
addition to his workbench. The actions that are part of his plan (saving money for the
tool, shopping for the best product at the best price, creating space for it in his workshop,
ordering it from a dealer, going to the store to pick it up, and so on) cease when he has
the tool in his possession. Nevertheless, he values the tool for the things he may
potentially make with it (notwithstanding the possibility that he might also derive some
pleasure in owning the tool or in admiring the elegance of its design and construction-a
modest final good).
Common goods, of course, may also be instrumental or final, but here it might be
better to speak of them as constructive or substantive. A constructive common good is a
set of conditions that makes it possible for members of an association to pursue their
individual goals or to collaborate in the pursuit of common goals. Patrons in a library
who maintain the quiet atmosphere sustain a constructive common good by doing, a
common good which nonetheless permits each of them to pursue individual study.
Substantive common goods are shared final goods, especially those that are the result of

32

Apart from those common goods that directly constitute instances of human fulfillment, all common
goods have an instrumental character. Moreover, the categories of private goods that they serve are
incommensurable. That is, goods in the category of speculative knowledge are, in principle, neither
superior nor inferior to goods in other categories, like health, aesthetic experience or skillful
performance. Indeed, we would generally consider it perverse for someone to value health only because
it served to increase the opportunities for aesthetic experience, or for someone to make every other aspect
of his life subordinate to the maintenance of his health. This is not to say, of course, that these things
never happen, but rather that they are examples of practical irrationality when they do occur.
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collaborative efforts. Examples could include victory for a sports team or achieving an
award for manufacturing excellence.
Constructive common goods, even though that are instrumental, may nevertheless
be highly valued. Peace, order, and justice in a society are extremely important, not
because they have an intrinsic value apart from their utility in supporting human wellbeing, but because they are virtually indispensable for individual flourishing. It would
therefore not be unreasonable for a person to make extraordinary sacrifices-even
to the
33
point of laying down his life-to instantiate and protect these goods.
With respect to the actions of associations, though, common goods may be mixed,
that is, they may have a kind of final character to the extent that the association ceases its
collaborative activities once the good is attained. Thus a committee may form to build a
new playground for a community and disband once the playground is completed. The
finished playground is a final good (goal) for the committee, even though the playground
promotes (that is, is an instrument for) private goods (e.g., health, play, friendships)
indefinitely. Similarly, an army or an alliance may be formed in time of war in order to
attain the good of victory, and suspend its operations once the war is over.
Totalitarian governments make the serious mistake of regarding the common goods
of the state as substantive, as absolutely final, and so in the end become willing to
sacrifice all manner of private goods for their sake. 3 4 Even in wiser societies, caution
must always be exercised in crafting and applying positive laws so that the conditions
that must exist in a society to promote the flourishing of its members are adequately
protected while at the same time private goods are not unreasonably harmed.3 5 To be
sure, in any society, some private goods are incompatible with sustaining these public
conditions and so may be legitimately curtailed (e.g., free speech need not be protected if
it is slanderous)-but a prudent balance must nevertheless be maintained.
Certain common goods may be final in another way as well. Some unlimited
common goods may be genuinely final if their use or enjoyment itself constitutes an
element of integral human fulfillment. For example, something of beauty, whether natural
like a sunset or artificial like a fine painting, directly instantiates the object of aesthetic
experience. Similarly, purely speculative knowledge (the sort of knowledge that satisfies

33 The Catholic tradition has maintained that such sacrificial actions may be matters of charity or justice,
and that societies may rightly demand sacrifices of some of its members if those sacrifices may be
necessary to preserve the constructive common good of the society. But justice also demands that the
sacrifices be distributed fairly and according to relevant criteria.
34 In CST, the purpose of the state is ultimately to serve the private goods (i.e., the well-being) of
individuals. The state may require sacrifices from some individuals in order that it may continue to serve
the well-being of all, but it cannot legitimately subordinate the well-being of all its citizens to its own
perpetuation and strength. To do so would be the greatest betrayal.
35 Even within a single society these conditions may vary with circumstances. A society that finds itself at
war may need to impose limitations on travel and communication (private goods) so that other elements
of well-being are protected.
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simple wonder and curiosity) can be valued for its own sake, as opposed to practical
knowledge, which always has an instrumental character.
C.

COMMON GOODS ARE SHARED POSSESSIONS (ACTUAL) OR GOALS (POTENTIAL).

Like private goods, common goods may be either actual or potential. Actual goods are
those that, at a given point in time, really are owned, used, or enjoyed. Potential goods
are those that, while not presently owned, used, or enjoyed, are apprehended as real
possibilities. Actual goods (whether common or private) do not, of course, motivate
action intended to achieve them, though they may motivate protective action or action
aimed at use or enjoyment. On the other hand, potential goods do serve to motivate goaldirected action, and potential common goods motivate collaborative action. Indeed,
underlying any genuinely collaborative action (as opposed to an aggregate of individual
actions aimed at the same goal, e.g., a gold rush) there must be a least one potential
common good.36
D.

THE COMMON GOOD OF THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY.

In contemporary discussions of CST the term "common good" is ordinarily taken to refer
primarily, if not uniquely, to the common good of the political community. This common
good is a constructive good of fundamental importance, but as such it is instrumental and
not final. 3 7 It serves the private well-being of the individual members of a society but
since the individual members are social by nature, the common good commands
individual respect and support. 38 While in earlier ages, when human communities were
relatively isolated from one another, it was possible to speak of the common good as
applying to groups no larger than nations. In the modern world, however, with the almost

36

Potential common goods are frequently merely instruments for the attainment of private goods.

Employees working together to make a company profitable may be less concerned (or even not at all
concerned) about the long-term health and financial integrity of the business than about the things they
may buy with the salary and bonus they receive from the successful operations of the firm. Such persons
are not truly engaged in collaborative action, but rather use a community of some sort to achieve their
private goals. More thoughtful members recognize that, in addition to whatever private goals may be
served by the effective operations of the association, there is also a goodness (associated with the good of
friendship) to purposeful action pursued in communion with others. Action of this sort is more genuinely
human, and goal-directed action is defective that intentionally avoids or extinguishes collaboration where
collaboration would be effective, even if not maximally efficient.
37 The classic definition of the common good of the political community is found in CST in Mater et
magistra 65: [The common good] "embraces the sum total of those conditions of social living whereby
men are enabled more fully and readily to achieve their own perfection." Similar language can be found
in Gaudium et spes 26, where the Council essentially adopted John's definition: [The common good is]
"the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members
relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment."
38 Practical reasonableness requires that individuals not act in ways that would undermine the common
good ((respect) and be open to acting in ways that would better instantiate it (support). It would be
irrational for an individual deliberately to attack the common good of the society since by doing so he
would incrementally decrease his own well-being and likelihood of achieving genuine fulfillment. Of
course, such irrationality is not uncommon.
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universal interdependence of peoples throughout the globe, we must consider the
common good to be that of the entire human community.

IV. COMMON GOODS AND SPECIALIZED ASSOCIATIONS
Organizations are crucially important for modern life. Without organizations of the
number, variety, and size that we see in the developed world, our quality of life could
simply not be what it is. The incredible diversity of goods and services we enjoy would
not exist nor, in fact, would so many other things that we have come to take for granted.
Without smoothly functioning organizations our diets would lose much of their variety,
our health care would be 3much
more primitive, we would travel less, know less, and
9
generally live poorer lives.
While every association that human beings form is deliberately intended by
someone to bring about some human good, not every association succeeds in doing so.
Some fail because the actual goods at which they are aimed are illusory and do not
provide any genuine human satisfactions. Others fail even though they aim at genuine
goods because they are so poorly structured and managed that they cannot achieve their
goals. Still others fail both tests: they aim at the wrong things and being poorly structured
cannot achieve even these goals. The fundamental goal of professional management is
the creation and support of excellent organizations, which both aim at worthy goals and
are properly structured and managed. In order to avoid these failures we need to have
answers to two kinds of questions.
One of these is the question of how to go about achieving a goal, that is, what
methods work, what tools and skills are required, what techniques are useful, and so on.
The second question concerns the why of what we do, that is, what goals we should be
pursuing. In the context of managing organizations we want to know what the legitimate
purposes of the organization are and what organizational structures and policies will best
accomplish those purposes.
The answers to these questions provide us with a means to evaluate the quality of
organizations. Poor organizations either fail to accomplish their goals or achieve their
goals only by damaging other goods in the process. Satisfactory organizations will be
successful in achieving a limited range of goals and they will do so without
systematically damaging other goods. However, excellent organizations will achieve and
promote a much wider range of relevant goods, even if they do not "maximize" a
particular good to the degree that other structures and policies might.4 °

39 There is no doubt, of course, that modern technologies and modern organizations have also served to
introduce more stress into our lives and to coarsen them in a number of ways. This, however, is a result
of our flawed use of technology and organizations, not an inevitable consequence of their mere existence.
40 This, of course, is one of the key points of disagreement between CST and classical economic thinking
with respect to the question of corporate governance, and it needs to be explored further. For the
moment, though, consider that a police force that maximizes the number of criminals captured only by
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A.

THERE ARE THREE FUNDAMENTAL FORMS OF HUMAN ASSOCIATION.

Human beings are naturally inclined to form associations of all sorts, and for all sorts of
reasons. The variety is limitless in one sense because we can always form associations for
new and unprecedented purposes. In another sense, however, all associations fall into one
of three categories. In order to understand what an organization is (and what it is not) and
to see what makes an organization excellent, it will be helpful to explore these three
types.
The ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, was among the first to analyze human
associations systematically. Where his teacher, Plato, explored the nature of the ideal
state at length in his classic dialogue, The Republic, Aristotle set out to gather
information about and to understand human communities as they really existed. 4 1
He divided communities into three types, Families, Villages, and Cities (or what
today we might call a society). 42 Villages, he argued, evolved naturally from family units,
and cities from villages. His work became a basic resource for political science and
helped to form the conceptual framework of that discipline.
In any event, the most inclusive community is a political community, or society. A
political community can be understood in Aristotle's sense as one which makes available
everything that is required for a truly good human life. We might also call this a complete
community. When we speak about the common good, we often mean the set of goods or
conditions in a political community that best supports the flourishing of each person in
the community. This set of goods includes such elements as peace, justice, universal
education, participation in culture and public life, and so on. While in previous historical
periods, where political communities were truly isolated from one another, it might have
been possible to identify individual nations as political communities. Today, however, it
is probably necessary to speak about the entire human race as constituting one political,
or complete, community.
Another community is the family, and we might call this a quasi-complete
community. While the family clearly does not contain within itself the resources
necessary for a truly good human life, it is concerned with virtually every aspect of
human flourishing, just as a political community is. The common good of a family,
therefore, resembles the common good of a political community: it has as its goal every
aspect of the flourishing of its members (though its limited resources mean that it must
focus on preparing its members, rather than fulfilling them) and so requires peace,
fairness, and so on.

exercising very broad powers of search and seizure might not be an excellent organization. It succeeds on
one level, but it damages real goods in the process.
41 Aristotle's principal treatise is the Politics. He also is reputed to have done an extensive study of the
"constitutions" of a large number of Greek city-states. Only the Constitution of Athens has survived
42

largely intact, while the larger project exists only in fragments and quotations in other authors.
See Politics, Book I.
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A third kind of community is a specialized association, or an incomplete
community. A specialized association, as the name implies, is ordered not to the integral
fulfillment of its members, but rather toward attaining some human good or limited set of
goods. A business is a specialized association, but so is an army, an orchestra, a bowling
club, a university, a criminal syndicate, and virtually an indefinite number and variety of
human organizations.
B.

SPECIALIZED ASSOCIATIONS HAVE A SPECIAL CHARACTER.

As a subject of careful study, the city-state, or society, was Aristotle's particular focus.
He devoted some attention to the family and the household (an anonymous essay on the
subject was long thought to have been written by him), but not very much. Neither was
he much interested in villages because he considered them to be a transitional group, a
temporary development, wedged between the more enduring and important communities,
family and society. Until recently, philosophers have tended to give similar emphasis to
these two groups to the neglect of other associations, and therefore while there has been
over the centuries a great deal of ethical reflection on families and societies, there has
been next to none on other groups. To be fair, though, it has only been in the last century
or two that another kind of group-the organization-has developed as a large
and stable
43
kind of human group, and therefore played a significant role in human life.
A specialized association is defined by the goods that its members pursue through
collaborative action, which are the common goods of the organization. Some of the goods
are potential (i.e., goals) and these serve to focus and motivate collaboration. Others we
might call constructive, i.e., they are instrumental in character and consist of the
conditions necessary to promote and facilitate successful collaboration: justice,
communication, and so on. These constructive common goods are analogous to the
common good of a political community.
Our understanding of the relationship between a specialized community and a
political community needs further refinement. Until relatively recently (perhaps as late as
the 19th century) specialized associations played only a small role in human life. In the
20th century, however, that role has expanded greatly, both in terms of the size of
specialized associations and their numbers. In developed societies today, virtually
everyone is dependent upon specialized associations, directly or indirectly. 44

43 Traditionally when thinkers gave their attention to this alternate category, they tended to regard
organizations either as overgrown families or as little societies. (How often have we heard, for example,
about corporate 'families" or organizational "politics"?) Today they deserve our attention in their own
right. No doubt if Aristotle were alive today he would almost certainly have some interest in the nature of
modern organizations and their role in social life.
44 Which is not, however, to say that we lead lives that are socially richer. In many cases, while we may do
what we do in the context of an organization of some sort, we do these things not as members of a true
human community but as strangers in a crowd. Robert D. Putnam has described the curious decline of
community at a time of the increased importance of organizations in BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVALOF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
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These organizations should have considerable freedom in identifying and pursuing
goods, which, to the extent that they serve to focus and motivate collaboration, will
genuinely be common goods for that organization. To be morally legitimate these
common goods must be true human goods (and not merely apparent goods, like revenge)
and they must be pursued by morally sound means (so, a criminal organization might
pursue real goods but do so by immoral means). Furthermore, the pursuit of these goods
cannot undermine the constructive common good of the larger human community.
However, insofar as the goods pursued really are human goods, it is not necessary that
the goods of a specialized association intentionally and directly support the common
good of the larger community. They may quite legitimately do nothing more
than
45
facilitate the attainment of private goods by those associated with the organization

V.

CST AND THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATIONS

We began this paper by noting that the existence and activities of publicly-held business
corporations naturally raise certain questions from the perspective of the Catholic social
tradition. Contrary to the impressions that many people may form, these questions do not
concern the legitimacy of business corporations in principle, nor do they cast doubt on
the moral worthiness of profitability. They are instead questions about the conduct of
corporations, about the objectives they pursue and the goods they affect, and about the
responsibilities of those who manage them. Having summarized some key concepts from
46
CST, we will now turn to the task of offering some responses to these questions.
A.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF A BusiNEss CORPORATION?

A business corporation is a specialized association, which means that it is a kind of
human community, but one which is distinct from families (quasi-complete communities)
and societies (complete communities). As a specialized association, a business
corporation is not concerned by nature with every aspect of human flourishing, but
focuses instead and exclusively on a particular set of goods. Since it is an incomplete
community, there are many genuine goods that it does not atterrpt to realize.
45 That is, while the common goods of smaller communities must ordinarily be subordinated to the common

good of the larger community within which it exists, it is not the case that the common goods of smaller
communities must always be directed to serve the common good of the larger community. To put it
another way, the actions of smaller communities or associations must not be such as to undermine the
common good of the larger communities of which they are a part, although their actions need not always
aim deliberately to enhance that common good in particular ways in order to be morally sound. Business
organizations, therefore, need not use their resources to address social problems in order to be morally
worthy associations. They are morally worthy if they pursue authentic goods in ways that properly
respect other private goods and the common good of the larger community.
46 It is worth noting once more that the Catholic Church has no official position about the fine points of
managing business corporations, much less an official posture of hostility or suspicion. The task of
articulating a "Catholic" view of these questions is open to anyone who wishes to acquaint himself with
the principles of CST and to apply these principles to particular issues. The task will be done well to the
degree that the application is faithful to both the principles and the realities, but in no meaningful sense
do the private views of individual Catholics, such as the present author, become the "Catholic" position.
At best these views constitute an analysis consistent with the deeper principles of the Catholic tradition.
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The particular question we must address concerns what goods a business
corporation should or may legitimately pursue. Prevailing economic theory asserts that
the overriding objective of a business corporation is the maximization of the wealth
of
47
concur.
not
does
CST
events).
of
course
normal
the
in
shareholders,
owners (i.e.,
Does this mean that the tradition regards profit as morally unsavory, as some would
suggest? Quite the contrary. 48 CST regards profit as a good and prosperity as a blessing.
Nevertheless, and this is an important point, it does not and cannot regard profitability as
the dominant objective of a business. In 1991, Pope John Paul II expressed this view as
follows:
The Church acknowledges the legitimate role of profit as an indication that a
business is functioning well. When a firm makes a profit, this means that
productive factors have been properly employed and corresponding human
needs have been duly satisfied. But profitability is not the only indicator of a
firm's condition ....
In fact, the purpose of a business firm is not simply to
make a profit, but is to be found in its very existence as a community of
persons who in various ways are endeavoring to satisfy their basic needs, and
who form a particular group at the service of the whole of society. 49
Three things ought to be noted here. First, the success of a business is properly measured
in more than one way. Second, the purpose of a business has something to do with its
character as a community. And third, this community is deliberately put at the service of
the larger society.
We misconceive business, on the Catholic view, if we think of it as unidimensional, that is, as an activity or an organization that has only one goal to which
every other element is subordinated. In fact, business, like most activities in the real
world, is multi-dimensional. If a business is to be genuinely successful it must succeed on
47 Consider Centesimus annus 35: "Profit is a regulator of the life of a business, but it is not the only one;
other human and moral factors must also be considered which, in the long term, are at least equally
important for the life of a business." And see the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1997, 1 ,d edition)
#2424: "A theory that makes profit the exclusive norm and ultimate end of economic activity is morally
unacceptable."
48 It is certainly true that there is a strain in Christian thinking, rooted in ancient times, that regards profit
with considerable suspicion. This is so for at least two reasons. First, profitability has too often been
associated with greed (e.g., 1 Tim 6.10: "The love of money is the root of all evil."). Second, from
ancient times until the modern era the model of the businessperson was the traveling merchant (not the
manufacturer or the storekeeper), who often had, and deserved, the reputation of one who cheated his
customers.

49 Centesimus annus 35. The translation of the key phrase is quite literal. A more fluid translation might be
"Profit is not the only measure of a company's success." Lest this be seen merely as a quaint theological
position, consider the comment of Peter Drucker, long regarded as the most important management
thinker of the 20 th century: "Profitability is not the purpose of but a limiting factor on business enterprise
and business activity. Profit is not the explanation, cause, or rationale of business behavior and business
decisions, but the test of their validity." PETER DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES (1973) at 60.
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several levels at once, which is to say that it must achieve a balance between several
criteria, such as profitability, employee satisfaction, and product quality and value. 50 A
business that fails
to achieve this balance cannot long maximize the criterion it chooses to
1
be dominant. 5
The second point reminds us that businesses are associations of persons who come
together more or less freely to pursue goals of mutual interest and benefit, i.e., potential
common goods. At their best, in the real world, businesses are collaborative associations
that draw people together, not merely for personal gain (though few of them would do
their jobs if they were not paid) but because they are attracted by the activities and
ambitions of the organization. Real businesses are rarely organized by shareholders
seeking an investment; they are almost always organized by people captivated by an idea
who turn to capital markets only after they have proven that their idea can attract and
hold employees and customers.
Finally, as a community of persons, a business serves important but intangible
goods, not least of which is the good of friendship, broadly considered. It also serves the
larger society by offering goods and services that, at their best, meet the real needs of
customers. This is one way, though not the only way, in which businesses serve the
common good of the political community.
B.

WHAT IS THE STATUS OF SHAREHOLDERS?

In the ideal, CST conceives of a business corporation as a specialized association, as a
community of workers, managers and contributors of capital, dedicated to the service of
customers (which group potentially includes any member of the larger political
community). 52 Each member makes a contribution to the common goods of the
association (e.g., the achievement of the organization's legitimate goals, the creation of a
healthy and supportive workplace environment, the prosperity of the organization, etc)

50 Most sports are uni-dimensional activities. Only one thing really counts for success: the final score, the
fastest time, the longest throw, etc. But then sports are contrived and artificial, and not full-fledged
representations of real life. (Consider, though, figure skating, gymnastics, or diving, where flawless
execution and exceptional style are both required for a top performance.) This is one reason why sports
analogies are often misleading and distracting for business.
51 There are countless stories of companies that have oppressed employees and cut corners on customers in
order to pump up profits. It can work, for a time, but the imbalance such management practices create
will punish the company severely. So, too, will an excessive focus on employee satisfaction or customer
value (though these examples are rarer). By contrast, the relatively few companies that manage to
achieve a high level of profitability over time (decades rather than quarters) are almost always also
attentive to employees and to customers. IBM, Johnson & Johnson, and Southwest Airlines are
outstanding examples.
52 No matter that many businesses actually fall short of fulfilling every aspect of this description. It is to be
such a community that businesses ought to aspire, and so each contributing member should consider how
his contribution can help to make this aspiration a reality.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

19

Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 3
VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT

PAGE 48

and each member, in justice, deserves to receive a proportionate reward,
with special
53
attention given to the needs of the most vulnerable in the organization.
What, then, do shareholders contribute and what reward do they deserve to receive?
Must their interests be dominant in the decision-making of the organization's managers?
The tradition has little to say about shareholders as such, but instead tends to
consider them as a particular class of owners of property. 54 Because, as we saw above,
the ownership of property entails responsibilities, shareholders not only have rights to a
reward for their investment, but they have responsibilities as well. These responsibilities
55
are never detailed in the tradition, but we can suggest something about their shape.
In the first place, CST defends the right of shareholders to receive a reward from
their investment against those who would maintain that ownership is never a just title to
income. On the other hand, owners of capital, especially the wealthy, have a set of
obligations. The primary obligation is to ensure the well-being of one's family, including
parents, children, and others to whom one has responsibilities. 5 6 At minimum, then,
shareholders may claim a return on their investment that would permit them to discharge
these responsibilities, provided that this minimum would not constitute an unfairly large
portion of the revenue generated by the business. 57 It would probably also be reasonable
to say that CST could defend the right of shareholders to receive the "net" income
generated by a business, providing employees are justly compensated and customers are
treated fairly.
On the other hand, CST would not defend the right of shareholders as owners
simply to dispose of the assets of a community of work in any way they pleased. The
tradition would insist that shareholders, to the extent that particular legal arrangements in
a society made them "owners," have an obligation (morally, even if not legally) to use the
53 This latter means that businesses have an obligation to ensure that even the lowest paid ordinary, fulltime workers receive a compensation package sufficient to protect their human dignity.
54 Episcopal and papal teaching on economic matters is very pastoral, which is to say it responds to the
perceived pastoral needs and crises of the time. It never has constituted a careful, systematic treatise on
all matters economic. In the twentieth century some attention was given to questions about the internal
structure and governance of business corporations from say, 1930 to 1960. After this time, attention
turned more strongly to matters of international relations and development in the Third World. Ironically,
it was roughly at the end of this period that stock owning became more widely distributed, that pension
funds grew larger, and the issue of investor responsibility became more interesting. Over the last four
decades, the Church has had little new to say about the topic.
55 The discussions in the tradition, such as they are, tend to imagine investors as wealthy shareholders,
holding large amounts of stock. The tradition seems not to have paid much attention to the possibility
that shareholders of a corporation might be millions of small investors rather than a small numbers of
investors holding millions of shares each.
56 Catholic moral theology embraces what we might call a principle of proximity, which requires and
permits each person to care for those closest to him (i.e., those to whom he has the greatest and most
direct responsibilities) before attending to the needs of others.
57 This concept is more useful if we consider investors in the aggregate rather than considering small
individual investors separately.
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assets of a company to support the common goods of that company (and the larger
society as well). This could mean that shareholders in the aggregate might be obligated to
forgo selling the company or taking some other dramatic action in order to preserve the
long-term viability of the business. In short, the obligations of ownership prohibit
shareholders from making their interests dominant in all of the company's decision
making, nor, for that matter, could executives and managers always place the interests (or
supposed interests) of shareholders ahead of the interests of other members of the
community (principally, employees, but by extension, customers and others).58
Essential to an appreciation of this position is the recognition that shareholders are
not the only contributors to the success of a company. Employees, of course, are also
contributors and as such their formal compensation is a major element, but not the whole,
of what they deserve to receive from the organization. By contributing what they havetheir time, energy, talents and knowledge-they too invest in the company. Wages,
salaries and benefits are a major part of their reward for making this contribution, but
they also deserve the organization's loyalty. This duty of loyalty requires rmnagers (and
investors) to attend to questions of job security and continuing viability as elements of the
common good of the specialized association for which they are responsible. And it is not
a disservice or an injustice to shareholders for them to do so.
C.

WHAT WOULD IT MEAN TO MANAGE WELL?

Our present social and economic structure favors the formation of business organizations,
even large organizations, and disfavors independence in making a living. That is to say,
most people today will not work independently as craftsmen who own their businesses or
as family farmers. Most of us will work for organizations of one sort or another, and
these organizations will have a tendency, if they are healthy, to grow larger. Work is such
an important aspect of humans, though, that those who manage organizations will be not
merely stewards of financial resources, but stewards of other common goods as well.
From the perspective of CST, executives and managers are not merely the "agents"
of shareholders, but are stewards and distributors of all of the common goods of the
business. To be sure, they have a responsibility to attend to the legitimate interests of
shareholders, but not to the exclusion of the interests of other involved with the
community of work (e.g., employees and customers). They must therefore be concerned
that opportunities for work be fairly distributed, 59 and that the company make prudent
investments to ensure that it remains competitive and viable. They should respect the
human dignity of employees by permitting them some latitude in determining how their
jobs will be done and offering them appropriate opportunities to participate in decision

58 This does not mean that shareholder interests cannot sometimes triumph, or that companies cannot
legitimately layoff workers, close plants, and so on. It does mean that all such decisions must be referred
to the common good of the business, as a community of work, and to the common good of the society.
59 This would entail some attention to job security, to creating jobs where feasible, to paying fair
compensation, and so on.
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making. 60 In a larger context, they must make sure that the company's operations do not
undermine the common good of the society. This may mean that they will curtail or
remedy operations that create significant pollution, regardless of whether such remedies
are required by law. They may also properly factor into business decisions considerations
about the impact such decisions would have on the larger community. 61
In sum, CST respects the fact that executives and managers have a duty to attend to
the rightful interests of shareholders, but it does not maintain that they have a duty to put
shareholder interests ahead of the interests of other members of the community of work.

VI.

SUMMARY

The Catholic social tradition does not understand business corporations to be mere
aggregates of contracts and relationships. It conceives of them as communities of a
particular kind (specialized associations). While corporations, in fact, may not actually
manifest every characteristic of a community, this is what they should aspire to become.
As a community of work, a corporation exists to pursue several complementary
common goods. Among these common goods is the good of wealth and prosperity, which
the managers of the corporation should seek to distribute fairly among those who have
contributed to its creation. But the common good of wealth, while important and
legitimate, is not the dominant good to be sought. Other common goods include the
service of customers, the good of work for employees, and various goods promoted in a
healthy, viable workplace. The duty of managers is to achieve a practical balance
between these goods, so that none dominates to the severe detriment of the others.
Shareholders, for their part, deserve to be rewarded for their investment but this
right entails certain constraints. One constraint requires them to subordinate their claim to
the long-term well-being of the corporation. Another constraint requires them to permit
(and indeed encourage) the company to be operated in such a way as to support-or at
least not damage-the common good of the society.
The Catholic vision of the business corporation is not entirely compatible with the
theory of the firm offered by economics. And indeed more work needs to be done to
articulate just what this vision is and what it implies for the practice of management. In
the end, however, despite its disagreement with prevailing economic theory, the Catholic
vision may well prove to be the more practical.

60 This latter is sometimes misunderstood to mean that employees have a right to determine corporate

strategy or to veto painful decisions. CST does not require either and indeed defends the right of owners
and managers to exercise executive authority. It does, however, encourage participation in decision
making as an element of making businesses true communities of work.
61 So, for example, they might rightly be concerned with the effect on a community of a plant closing, not
necessarily as a dispositive factor, but as something properly taken into account.
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